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Afghan Values or Women’s Rights? Gendered Narratives about Continuity 
and Change in Urban Afghanistan 
 
Naila Kabeer, Ayesha Khan and Naysan Adlparvar 
 
 
Summary 
 
There is considerable debate about the extent to which gender equality and womens’ rights 
are universal values. This debate has been particularly heated in Afghanistan where the 
violation of women’s rights by the Taliban regime was one justification used by the US and its 
allies for their invasion of the country. There is, however, very little research on how ordinary 
Afghan women view their lives and their place within a highly patriarchal society and how 
their views might fit into these debates. This paper explores these issues using in-depth 
qualitative interviews with 12 Hazara women and their husbands in Kabul. These women are 
all associates of microfinance organisations and the paper also explores the extent to which 
access to microfinance has contributed to changes in their attitudes and relationships with 
others in their families and communities. The paper finds that microfinance is only one of the 
many changes that these women and their families have experienced in the course of their 
lives. While many of these changes have been extremely traumatic, they have also 
expanded women’s horizons, opening up the possibility of new ways of organising gender 
relations within the family and community. The paper concludes that while the Afghan 
women in the study may not espouse the idea of individual rights, they would like to see a 
fairer gender distribution of rights and responsibilities.  
 
 
Keywords: women’s rights, gender justice, microfinance, cultural relativism, classic 
patriarchy 
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Introduction 
 
This paper is part of a larger research project on the potential for paid work to provide 
pathways of empowerment for women living under different sets of patriarchal constraints. 
The concept of empowerment that informs this paper draws on Kabeer (1999, 2008). It sees 
women’s subordinate status in society as the product of the social norms, values and 
practices which constrain their capacity to exercise choice and agency in key areas of their 
lives and relationships. These constraints can operate at a number of different levels: 
cognitive, social and material. They can operate through the internalisation by women as well 
as men of societal norms and values which position women as inferior to men, less able or 
worthy to exercise control over their own lives or to have a say in shaping wider institutional 
arrangements which characterise their society. They can operate through the unequal nature 
of these arrangements which give men authority and power over women’s lives, whether it is 
through the gender-ascribed relationships of family, kinship and community or through the 
purportedly impersonal relations of the public domain. And they can operate through forms of 
material dependence which mean that women’s well-being and place in society will be 
jeopardised if they attempt to question the given social order. 
 
Empowerment is therefore defined as the processes of change through women gain the 
capacity for strategic forms of agency in the different spheres of their lives. Since such 
changes relate to the intersecting constraints which have disempowered women in a 
particular context, empowerment too is likely to encompass cognitive, social and material 
changes. These include women’s sense of identity and self-worth; their willingness and 
ability to question their subordinate status; their ability to make strategic life choices, 
including the renegotiation or rejection of inequality in their personal relationships and finally, 
their ability to participate on equal terms with men in reshaping the society in which they live.  
 
The fact that the gendered structures of constraint differ considerably across societies means 
that processes of empowerment are likely to vary considerably by context. The pathways 
through which change takes place in a society, and the forms of change that women 
themselves will prioritise, will be shaped in important ways by the nature of the constraints 
that prevail in a particular society so that there will be a certain degree of ‘path-dependence’ 
in the pace and pathways though which changes takes place in different societies (Kabeer 
2008).  
 
This paper uses detailed qualitative research to explore the empowerment potential of 
microfinance and paid work on the lives of 12 women and their families in the specific context 
of urban Afghanistan. The women in the study are all associated with two of the better known 
development NGOs (BRAC and Women for Women International (WfW)) that have been 
offering loans targeted to women since the fall of the Taliban regime. Given the turbulence of 
the country’s recent history, access to microfinance is clearly likely to represent only one of 
the many changes that the women in our sample have experienced. Nor is there any a priori 
reason to expect it to be the most significant.  
 
At the same time, it holds out the promise of expanding economic opportunities for women in 
a context in which powerful patriarchal constraints have long restricted their ability to take up 
paid work. One of the factors motivating this study is a survey of 1500 women in different 
parts of Afghanistan by Women for Women International with which Kabeer was involved 
(2009). The report found marked differences in the views and attitudes reported by women 
who were, or had been, associated with WfW compared to the rest. They were more likely to 
know about their rights, to believe that women had fewer rights than men in Afghanistan, to 
work outside the home and to express willingness to work outside the home. And while a 
remarkable 85 per cent of the sample were optimistic about the future of Afghanistan, 90 per 
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cent of WfW associates expressed this view. We were interested in exploring in greater detail 
what this finding might mean.  
 
We are therefore interested in exploring some of the specific impacts of microfinance in the 
Afghan context but locate our exploration within the broader context of continuity and change 
that makes up everyday life in Afghanistan today. We begin our analysis with a brief 
summary of this broader context and with some of the debates about women’s position in 
contemporary Afghan society.  
 
 
1  Women’s place in Afghan society:  
an ongoing tug of war 
 
The question of women’s place in Afghan society has, since the early years of the 20th 
century, been characterised by an ideological tug-of-war between modernising tendencies 
within the urban elite, the forces of conservatism represented by the Islamic ulama upholding 
the sharia law and a variety of rural and tribal communities governed by customary law 
(Barakat and Wardell 2002). This tug of war has taken on an increasingly international 
dimension in recent decades. The rise to power of the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1978, and the subsequent Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
(1979–1989) was associated with major efforts to emancipate women through recognition of 
their legal rights, including the right to work, abolition of arranged marriages and bride price, 
increase in the legal age of marriage and a massive literacy drive. However, as with earlier 
efforts to reform Afghan patriarchy, these efforts were imposed from the top and, in this case, 
by outside forces. Resistance to the Soviet influence became bound up with resistance to 
these emancipatory efforts (Centlivres-Demont 1994).  
 
The ensuing civil war, which pitted Soviet troops and government forces against various 
mujahidin groups, backed by the US and its allies, saw the destruction of the rural economy 
and a massive displacement of the rural population. Between 1979 and 1992 around 6 
million people had fled their places of origin to take refuge in Afghan cities or in neighbouring 
Pakistan and Iran. The mujahidin swept into power in 1992, ushering in one of the worst 
periods of lawlessness and human rights abuses, including widespread crimes against 
women, in the country’s history.  
 
They were ousted in 1994 by Taliban forces, largely drawn from young Pashtun men who 
had been trained in the refugee camps of Pakistan in a particularly conservative Islamic 
tradition and were backed by its then Islamic military regime. The Taliban held out the 
promise of restoring law and order but it became quickly evident that it was through a 
particularly harsh interpretation of Islam that discriminated both against women and ethnic 
minority groups. Its Ministry for the Enforcement of Islamic Virtue and Prevention of Vice, 
modelled along Saudi lines, imposed a virtual state of curfew on women, curtailing their 
freedom to move, to work and to be educated.  
 
The plight of Afghan women was given increasing publicity by the international media but it 
was not until the September 11th attacks on the US that it was presented as a humanitarian 
tragedy of sufficient scale to justify military intervention by western powers. The Karzai 
regime that replaced the Taliban had the full backing of the international community and the 
question of women’s rights came to the forefront in its attempts to construct a modern 
democratic state.  
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The new constitution recognises women’s equality before the law; a Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs dedicated to the advancement of women’s status was set up in 2002, along with the 
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) whose mandate to protect and 
promote human rights, also includes women’s rights. Women’s political participation is 
facilitated through the extension of voting rights, provision to participate in the national 
assembly and civic education. Finally, there is a strong emphasis on gender mainstreaming 
in donor funded programmes and projects.  
 
While these various provisions appear to hold out the promise of greater gender equality in 
Afghanistan, they do pose questions about whether these current efforts to emancipate 
women in Afghanistan are any different from previous efforts? While it could be argued that 
women have voted – in unprecedented numbers – for the internationally-backed Karzai 
government that has spearheaded reform, it does not necessarily follow that they were voting 
for the model of gender equality favoured by the international community (Abirafeh 2005).  
 
The continuing, often divisive, debates about the appropriate place for women in Afghan 
society suggest that this issue has not been resolved. Even among those who support 
women’s advancement as a desirable overall goal, there are dissenting views about how this 
is to be achieved. In particular, as Kandiyoti points out, there is the familiar divide between 
‘women’s rights as universal human rights vs. ‘feminism-as-imperialism’ (2007: 170), 
between those who believe that all attempts to advance the cause of women must be firmly 
grounded in the universality of women’s human rights and those who believe it must be 
negotiated on the basis of Afghan values. In the next section of the paper, we examine some 
examples of these competing perspectives in greater detail. These provide the point of 
departure for our own analysis of what the women in our sample value about their lives and 
relationships, what aspects of change they might support and how their perspectives play out 
in relation to current debates.  
 
 
2  Afghan values or universal rights: current 
debates 
 
There are important areas of overlap among those who would like to see improvements in 
women’s position in Afghan society but disagree about how it should be brought about. First 
of all, there is widespread recognition that a major reason for the failures of past efforts to 
reform women’s position was that they were driven from the top-down by urban ruling elites 
(Barakat and Wardell 2002; Ahmed-Ghosh 2003; Kandiyoti 2007). As a result, their effects 
were largely confined to a small minority of women from the middle and upper classes of 
Kabul who were able to move around unescorted in the city, who regarded education as their 
right and who expected their own careers. The changes failed to filter down to women from 
the lower-middle and poorer classes of Kabul who continued to live much of their lives 
secluded within the domestic domain, rarely leaving their home without a male escort. Nor 
did they filter down to the majority of the population living in the vast rural hinterlands of the 
country.  
 
There is also general agreement that gender inequalities in the country reflect a kinship and 
family system that has many features in common with what Kandiyoti (1988) described as 
‘classic patriarchy’ and Caldwell summarised as ‘extended, patrilineal, patrilocal, patriarchal, 
endogamous and occasionally polygynous’ (1978: 558 citing Patai 1971: 84). In the Afghan 
context, these patriarchal structures are rooted in a society constituted by different  
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ethnic/tribal groups engaged in nomadic pastoralism, herding and farming, and settled 
agriculture and all organised along patrilineal lines (Moghadam 2002; Barakat and Wardell 
2002).  
 
There is a marked gender division of roles and responsibilities. Men are given primacy in the 
public sphere and are responsible for providing for the family and upholding family honour 
through the protection of women’s virtue. The institution of purdah curtails women’s mobility 
in the public domain and confines them to roles and responsibilities that can be carried out in 
the domestic sphere. They are only supposed to move about in the public domain with a 
male guardian. They therefore remain economically dependent on men for much of their 
lives. They are married off at an early age, generally within the extended kinship group, in 
exchange for bride-wealth and are expected to produce children as soon as possible.  
 
Thirdly there is agreement that while patriarchal relations in Afghanistan may share certain 
generic features, there are also considerable variations across the country – by class, 
ethnicity and location. Even the veiling of women has ethnic and regional variations. The all-
encompassing burqa, for instance, which was imposed by the Taliban as mandatory for any 
woman in the public domain, is mainly associated with female propriety among women in the 
Pashtun community, considered to be the most conservative of the different tribal groups. 
Women from some of the other ethnic groups may opt to cover themselves with large 
scarves or chadors (Abu-Lughod 2002). Women living in rural mountainous areas where 
entire settlements are made up of kin often exercise greater freedom of movement outside 
the home than women from lower-middle and poorer classes in urban households (Barakat 
and Wardell 2002). 
 
Where opinions diverge is with regard to the implications of these patriarchal structures on 
women’s lives and worldviews. One set of arguments, clearly aimed at countering Western 
depictions of Afghan culture as backward and uniquely oppressive to women, highlight the 
importance of local culture and religion in shaping Afghan women’s own values and vision of 
change. As Abu-Lughod (2002: 787) points out, ‘ “Afghan values” are as much products of 
their country’s history and location in an interconnected world as any other set of values, 
including Western ones’. While critical of the essentialising assumptions of cultural relativism, 
she questions whether the language of ‘emancipation, equality and rights’ is the only 
language available to those seeking to bring about change in women’s lives in Afghanistan. 
Was it not possible to recognise that women might strive for other goals that are equally 
important, such as closeness of family relationship, a peaceful society and the cultivation of 
religious piety? As she notes, many Afghan women looked to Iran for inspiration in their 
struggle for equality because it represented a country where women had made significant 
gains within an Islamic framework. An international politics of solidarity based on respect for 
cultural difference would mean recognising that Afghan women might have very different 
ideas about justice and aspire to a very different vision of society than the gender equality 
model espoused by the international community.  
 
Barakat and Wardell also argue for the importance of local values. They suggest that 
regardless of differences of ethnicity, location and class, Afghan women are defined by their 
roles as wives and mothers and this is central to their identity: ‘No matter how vital a 
woman’s economic contribution to her family’s well-being, this remains of secondary 
importance to her position as wife and mother’ (2002: 920). They point out that women’s 
revered status within the family is upheld by Quranic teachings: ‘the mother is the gateway to 
heaven, sons need the forgiveness of their mother before they can enter heaven: the power 
and value of a mother’s chaddar (head covering) is critical in the mobilization of men’ (2002: 
920). And they cite research to suggest that Afghan women themselves uphold these values: 
‘Afghan women wield considerable power within Afghan society, …their opinions are 
respected and those viewing Afghan society through a Western feminist prism often fail to 
take certain concepts of obligations and responsibilities into account’ (2002: 920).  
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Barakat and Wardell suggest that the primary mistake of analysts unfamiliar with Afghan 
culture is their preoccupation with women’s absence from the public domain and concomitant 
neglect of the private domain of family and kinship. Yet it is in the private domain in which 
women exercise most influence and which represents their primary source of security and 
status in Afghan society. They argue therefore for ‘gradual, cautious and culturally sensitive 
approaches’ which recognise that women’s needs are inseparable from those of their family 
and kinship and do not seek to jeopardise these institutions. Rather than singling women out 
for assistance, as many development agencies have done, they should work with women as 
an integral part of the family unit, ‘harnessing coping strategies that utilize family 
mechanisms authentically shaped by Afghan culture and traditions’ (2002: 925).  
  
Their view of the separate but complementary nature of family and kinship relationships is 
challenged by other contributors to the debate. While Ahmed-Ghosh (2006) agrees that 
women in Afghanistan are defined by their place within the family and community and that 
their economic and social security is tied to their familial roles and identity, she draws a 
different set of conclusions about its implications. She sees family and kinship relationships 
as simultaneously the key source of women’s survival, wellbeing and security as well as the 
primary structure of their oppression. Denied education, employment or property by custom 
and religion, perceived as bearers of family honour, women’s ‘complementary’ and 
subordinate relationship to men serves to secure the social standing of the family and the 
coherence of the community but at the cost of their ability to negotiate their rights or protect 
themselves: ‘…education about rights becomes superfluous because women do not have the 
means to disassociate themselves from the family nor claim autonomy based on economic 
self-sufficiency’ (2006: 124). Her conclusion therefore is that women need a degree of 
economic independence before they can engage in any struggle to define or demand their 
rights.  
 
Moghadam (2002) similarly rejects the benign view of women’s status within the family. She 
notes that while senior patriarchal figures within the kinship group exercise authority over all 
family members, including younger men, female members are subjected to far more 
restrictive norms and values than males and occupy a more subordinate position. 
Improvements in their status within the household are not merely bound up with the bearing 
of children, as Barakat and Wardell (2002) maintain, but the bearing of sons. The strong 
culture of son preference in Afghanistan explains the excess levels of female mortality and 
high proportions of men to women that have long characterised the country’s population – 
although the masculinity of its sex ratio has declined after many years of conflict.  
 
Moghadam attributes the slow progress on women’s basic human rights in Afghanistan to 
structural constraints which long predate the draconian controls over women imposed by the 
Taliban. She points also to the absence of a strong central state capable of implementing 
modernising programmes in the face of the ‘tribal feudalism’ that has thwarted sporadic 
efforts to do so throughout the 20th century. Finally she comments on the silence of many 
international feminists with regard to the worst excesses of the Mujahidin which appeared to 
reflect the widespread view that the promotion of women’s rights was somehow inappropriate 
in a developing Muslim country. She strongly rejects the politics of cultural relativism that 
maintains that women’s rights and gender justice must be defined on the basis of local norms 
and values and calls for a transnational feminist politics that is unified around a set of basic 
issues such as education, income and reproductive rights for women – regardless of cultural 
context.  
 
These debates about gender relations in Afghanistan clearly offer contrasting evaluations of 
the consequences of patriarchal constraints for women’s voice, status and influence in 
Afghan society and mirror larger debates about universalism versus cultural relativism in the 
development literature. We would like to draw attention to two aspects of this debate that 
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provide the point of departure for the present paper. The first is that while there is a general 
caution against sweeping generalisations about ‘Afghan women’, there is very uneven 
attention given to the possibility that there might be dissenting views about Afghan values 
among Afghan women themselves. Indeed, Barakat and Wardell (2002) suggest that where 
such dissension exists, it represents a division between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ perspectives. 
While Abu-Lughod cautions against essentialising Afghan culture and taking a more 
historical view of it, her focus too is on the values closely associated with this particular 
history (2002). It is Moghadam (2002) who points out the need to recognise the possibility 
that Afghan women might hold a variety of different positions with regard to Afghan traditions 
and values: while some women may find security and status within the accepted boundaries 
of the family, there are others who seek to challenge the public-private distinction in both 
open and hidden ways.  
 
The second point is related to the first. Despite the recent flurry of publications dealing with 
gender relations in Afghanistan, we know very little about the views and values of ordinary 
women – and men – who are the subject of these debates. Where women’s voices are cited 
in the literature, they tend to be women who are already highly politically active or prominent 
within the NGO community in Afghanistan.1 We therefore have very little idea how those that 
are not similarly active or prominent might position themselves in relation to these debates. It 
is this gap in the literature that our research seeks to address.  
 
 
3  A note on methodology 
 
Given that our research in Afghanistan is part of a larger project on the theme of paid work 
as a pathway of women’s empowerment, we needed to identify a suitable group of working 
women to participate in our research. Current evidence shows extremely low levels of 
economic activity by women in Afghanistan, including in urban areas, and much of it in 
various forms of self-employment (World Bank 2005). We consequently decided to use 
access to microfinance as the focus of our research and contacted two microfinance 
organisations, BRAC and WfW, who were working exclusively with women, to help us select 
our sample. Given the difficulties of carrying out fieldwork in Afghanistan, we decided to 
restrict our research to Kabul. In any case, microfinance organisations tend to be more active 
in urban areas. The organisation of the fieldwork, including interviews and translation, was 
carried out by Naysan Adlparvar and Sogol Zand. The interviews were carried out in two 
rounds. In the first round (carried out between May 2009 and July 2009), 12 women were 
approached to participate in the research, the objectives of the research explained to them 
and their consent obtained. Detailed interviews, following a loose life history format, were 
then carried out. Wherever possible, a second interview was carried out with at least one 
senior member of the family, usually the husband, in order to get a different perspective on 
the women’s contributions. There were six such secondary interviews. The interviews were 
mainly carried out in Dari and then translated into English. A preliminary reading of the 
interviews identified certain gaps in the information provided and a number of women were 
visited a second time in October 2009. 
 
The women in our sample range from lower-middle class to poor working class but given that 
microfinance organisations do not generally lend to the extreme poor, none of the women in 
our sample came from this category. While we did not set out to study any particular ethnic 
group, our sample is made up entirely of women from the Hazara community. The main 
reason for this is that this group, who make up around 9 per cent of the population, has long 
                                                 
1  Even a recent article by Ahmed-Ghosh (2006) entitled ‘Voices of Afghan Women’ which does draw directly on women’s 
voices to discuss the issue of women’s rights is limited to the voices of three internationally prominent women activists 
from Afghanistan who each have well-worked out political views about the way forward for women.  
 11 
 
been seen as among the most repressed in the country and are consequently favoured by 
organisations working with poorer sections of society. They made up the majority of the 
women that were being served by both the two microfinance organisations we were working 
with. They speak Dari and are largely Shia. They thus differ in important ways from the 
Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan (around 60 per cent of the population) who 
are mainly Pashto-speaking Sunnis. Unlike the majority Sunni community, Hazara women 
never fully adopted the full covering of the burqa, opting instead for the full length open-faced 
chador/namoz. They have a long history of persecution and were singled out by the Taliban. 
Many fled to Iran and Pakistan for safety. The Hazara community is considered to have 
somewhat less repressive gender relations than the majority Pashtun community (Minority 
Rights Group n.d.). Consequently, they allow us to explore the question of Afghan values 
and women’s rights from the margins rather than from the mainstream of Afghan society.  
 
In this paper, we use the narratives of the women in our sample to explore the extent to 
which they do indeed value the roles and responsibilities assigned to them by their society, 
as asserted by some authors, the extent to which they would like to see change, as claimed 
by others, and the kinds of changes that they would like to see. We are interested not only in 
what they have to say about these matters but also in what their narratives tell us about the 
influence of the larger forces of continuity and change in their society on the values, beliefs 
and preferences that they express. If women accept the status, roles and relationships 
ascribed to them by their culture, is it because this gives meaning and purpose to their lives, 
because they are unable to imagine any alternative set of social arrangements or because 
failure to comply would incur too high a social cost? And if women cite instances of injustice 
in their lives, do they see such injustice as the product of individual aberration or something 
more systemic?  
 
 
4  Reinforcing patriarchal norms: the forces of 
continuity in women’s lives  
 
4.1 Gender and everyday life in urban Afghanistan  
Kabul has seen unprecedented growth in its population since the fall of the Taliban, as 
millions of displaced Afghans have headed to cities instead of rural areas, in an effort to 
stake out a new livelihood strategy for their families. The livelihood strategies mapped out by 
the women respondents are clearly a contemporary response to the current economic 
scenario and opportunities. Their families were, and continue to be divided, across the 
region, having moved around a number of times during the last decades of conflict from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran, back to Kabul, only to regroup elsewhere if income cannot 
be generated. Goods and money continue to flow across these divisions, allowing people to 
survive in difficult times.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the upheavals that they have been through, the description of family 
life that emerges from the women’s narratives conforms in many ways to the division of roles 
and responsibilities associated with classic patriarchy. The women in our sample, together 
with their daughters, bore primary responsibility for domestic chores, regardless of other 
demands on their time from income generation or, in the case of the latter, education. All but 
one of the women in our sample were engaged in some form of paid work, although only one 
or two worked in a formal office job or reported a daughter that did. The rest worked on an 
informal, and generally intermittent, basis within or near the home (see Appendix). Activities 
included running a small shop, working as a guard, making quilts, breaking almonds, 
hairdressing , home-based embroidery, carpet weaving, making tassels for scarves, baking, 
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tailoring and livestock rearing. One woman had set up her own bakery, another opened a 
hairdressing salon, while one cleaned offices on a casual basis. Most women kept back 
some or all of their income for household needs. While the demands of work and loan 
repayment required some of the women in our sample to move around in the public domain – 
to go to shops, bakeries, NGO offices – they stressed that their husbands always knew 
where they were and they were generally accompanied, even if it was only by one of their 
children.  
 
Men exercised authority, made key decisions and managed family finances. While a number 
of them did the shopping for the household, neither fathers nor sons participated in domestic 
work. Their economic activities, both current and past, bore the imprint of many years of 
conflict more clearly than those of the women. They were far more heterogeneous than those 
of the women, entailed greater geographical distances and straddled legal and illegal 
activities. They included working in the army, heroin smuggling, working for a bus company, 
running a taxi or cart, trading in stolen antiques, daily wage labour, renting out equipment, 
portering, trading in salt or potatoes, running a tailoring shop or grocery shop and office jobs. 
Some of the men were unemployed. Most men were out of the house most of the day, 
coming home only in the evening to eat, watch TV and sleep. They had many more 
opportunities to engage in wider social interactions than women as well as meeting regularly 
with other men from the extended family for Quran reading sessions and discussion of family 
matters.  
 
4.2 Rights, responsibilities and the patriarchal contract 
This division of roles and responsibilities meant that the domestic domain featured as a far 
more significant location for the women’s daily lives than those of the men. Many families 
lived within extended family networks so that while husbands and children occupied centre 
stage in women’s narratives, members of the extended family – primarily husband’s kin – 
also featured frequently. If we want to understand the forces of continuity in women’s 
subordinate status in Afghan society, then the continued centrality of family and kinship in 
women’s lives, and the sheer historical weight of its norms and traditions, must play a central 
role.  
 
Many of the women we interviewed subscribed to a normative model of relations between 
men and women within the family based on the idea of a patriarchal contract, often drawing 
on religion as sanction, which spelt out their rights and responsibilities. They accepted that 
men’s greater responsibilities in providing for their families and protecting family honour 
justified their greater rights and privileges, including decision-making power over their wives 
and children and the right to discipline them – with the use of violence if necessary.  
 
In some cases, women offered accounts which emphasised the mutuality of rights and 
responsibilities. According to Jamila:  
 
... women have rights. They work hard at home, they raise their children. Only God 
knows what is happening in a mother’s heart from the time that children are little to 
when they become adults. That is why mothers have rights and children have to 
respect their mothers. Women also have rights with regard to others… she is a 
partner in the house. When she marries, both husband and wife have rights. When 
you have a daughter-in-law, you should accept that this is her home as well. God 
gives these rights, they are God’s words… Men have rights. They work hard, they 
make money. If they work in an office, their brains work. If they are daily labourers, 
they use their sweat. The man has rights over his wife and children. … his rights 
are whatever is required: good food, clothes washed, house clean, children 
educated, no fighting in the house, taking care of guests, having his tea and food 
ready, making sure daughters are not around boys… 
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For other women, their rights were conditional on male consent; without it they could not 
exercise their rights. As Farah put it: ‘Women’s rights come from their husbands. If I want to 
buy something, I ask my husband. If he says, lets paint the house, I accept it’. 
 
Others believed that religion legitimated a male monopoly of rights. As Pareesha put it:  
 
A man’s rights are clear. In their opinion, they are free, they can have ten wives, they 
can go anywhere. These are men’s rights. If my husband marries another woman, 
what can I do? Islam has given these rights. Imam Ali. He is the first and most 
important iman of the Shias. He had forty wives and we are his followers. Men are able 
to have two or three wives at least. 
 
The significance that many women attached to the patriarchal contract was evident in their 
constructions of the ‘virtuous woman’ as the woman who complied unquestioningly with its 
terms. Farah described her attempts to make the transition from a carefree unmarried ‘girl at 
home’ who took an interest in her clothes and had her own money to spend to a virtuous 
married woman whose primary duty was to her husband:  
 
I am ‘heavier’ now [more composed]. I used to think about myself, but I am free from 
these thoughts now. I wash my husbands’ clothes, I support him… Be an ‘outside’ 
woman if you have to but it doesn’t mean that you should not do the work at home. I 
work in a way that my husband can never have any excuse to say, why are you like 
this? 
 
Layla’s account offered an even sharper contrast between the virtuous submissive woman 
and the loose and fearless woman who was her diametrical opposite:  
 
I am a woman and I pray to God that he does not make me fearless…Those women 
who are fearless go to whore houses. I am scared of my husband. Husbands have to 
control women or men will lose their reputations. Women can be very loose. A woman 
should be conservative. She shouldn’t talk to strangers… My husband is crippled but I 
look up to him, my children look up to him. I wash his clothes. I won’t step outside 
without his permission. If I go out, he gets angry and says, why did you go out without 
my permission? I am scared of him. I always ask him whether I can go out or not. 
Maybe he sometimes slaps me.  
 
For Farah and Layla, anticipation of their husband’s expectations was the guiding principle 
for their behaviour, but whereas the former sought to pre-empt the possibility of a reprimand 
from her husband, Layla’s compliance was underpinned by fear of her husband. Although 
she only referred in passing to her husband’s use of physical violence, her son confirmed 
that he had often beaten both his wife and sons.  
 
In fact, one of the most striking findings emerging from our interviews, and one supported by 
the secondary literature,2 was the high levels of physical violence that punctuated everyday 
life. Almost every woman in our admittedly small sample reported direct experience of 
violence, their accounts often backed up by children who were sometimes present at the 
interview. Along with references to violent outbreaks between men in the community, there 
were reports of mothers-in-law beating daughters-in-law, brothers beating sisters, parents 
beating their children and, most frequently of all, husbands beating their wives. Men’s right to 
                                                 
2  Violence against women – including physical, sexual and psychological violence - is one of the main security problems 
for women in Afghanistan (Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) 2008) to the extent of being considered ‘natural’ in 
Afghan homes (DFID 2008). Of 2133 cases recorded by MoWA, between 2005–06, 47 per cent were related to beating 
and 36 per cent to ‘forced’ marriage (MoWA 2008). Of the acts of violence committed against women, 82 per cent were 
by family members (UNIFEM 2006).  
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beat their wives appeared to be an accepted feature of the marital contract: husbands were 
justified in beating their wives if they ceased to behave like ‘good’ women, acted selfishly or 
wilfully disobeyed their husbands or, as in the case of Hafiza, because they had failed to 
produce a son. The use of violence thus served to reinforce the effects of social norms in 
securing women’s submission to the patriarchal authority structure of the family.  
 
However, the incidence of violence reported by our respondents could not be fully explained 
by perceived failures or transgressions on the part of women. As some of the women 
themselves acknowledged, they were also bound up with the stresses and strains that men 
were going through as a result of the disruptions to the economy caused by several years of 
conflict, the erosion of their capacity to carry out their breadwinning roles and the frustrations 
this engendered. An exceptionally large number of the husbands in our sample were, for 
various reasons, unable to live up to their socially ascribed roles of primary breadwinners. 
Some were disabled, as in the case of Layla’s husband, some could not find jobs, some only 
worked on an intermittent basis while others lived in constant fear of losing the jobs they had.  
 
Many of the women explained their husbands’ violence in language that – consciously or 
unconsciously – touched upon the consequences of these stresses and strains. In the case 
of Naz’s husband, violence appeared to have physical origins: he had an accident which 
affected his hearing and left him prone to headaches: ‘he is sick, it is not his fault’. But it had 
also left him ‘very bad-tempered: the moment you speak, he shouts, whatever he can grab, 
he throws… he does not beat me but he throws everything at the door, at the walls, he 
shouts at the children’.  
 
Farah described her husband as a ‘nervous wreck’: ‘He is moody. Sometimes he is so good 
and sometimes he is so bad-tempered, he gets angry and slaps and kicks me’. She did not 
necessarily consider this as acceptable behaviour, but she was also resigned to it:  
 
I told him. ‘I hope you die young’. If I had the power, I would want to beat him. But I told 
myself, you are a woman, you have to tolerate it… Last time he beat me because there 
was no food in the house and he said I should have told him. Later he said sorry and I 
said, it is OK, women are for beating.  
 
Parwana’s husband was ‘always anxious and tense’. She attributed it to his experience in the 
army:  
 
All military men are like this… He did not beat us but my children were very scared of 
him… I was scared of him too. I was very young and he was old… I would speak softly 
so that my children would not lose their spirit. I was scared of breaking the peace.  
 
It also transpired that her husband had started drinking alcohol on a daily basis about a year 
ago which led to an increase in his violence towards his children. However, he has stopped 
this now as he is afraid of his sons.3 Her husband himself admitted to us that he had been a 
‘bit tough’ on the children and that he had once kicked his wife though he could not 
remember the reason for it. He told us that the constant stresses of survival made him angry. 
His main concern was the insecurity of his present employment with a development agency 
which had begun to lay off many of its workers.  
 
Pareesha had earlier been forced into marriage with a man that she described as ‘psychotic’: 
‘I would have rather looked into the eyes of a dog than into the eyes of my first husband. He 
didn’t like me either and he used to beat me’. She had divorced him with her family’s support 
but had to leave her three sons behind. She had subsequently remarried to a man who had 
two daughters and one son from a previous marriage. They later had two sons of their own. 
                                                 
3  As he told us, they had started going to body building classes. 
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She described her current husband as ‘bad-tempered’: ‘He doesn’t make any concessions. 
He starts beating’. One of their most violent rows had been in Iran when she had arranged a 
birthday party for their child without letting him know. 
 
While his violence appeared to increase when they returned to Afghanistan, she was 
sympathetic because she saw what his failure to find a job did to him: ‘It was very hard for 
him, he was supposed to be the breadwinner of the family’. Things improved after she began 
to take loans from BRAC and he was able to set up a taxi business. He still came home 
angry and frustrated because as she explained: ‘Poor him: he is alone. He is not in a good 
financial situation. He brings issues from outside into our home’. To this day, she said that: ‘If 
I go anywhere without his permission, I would have butterflies in my stomach’. Pareesha’s 
husband acknowledged his violence towards her but was clearly uncomfortable about it: 
‘Why should I lie, yes, sometimes I had to beat her, but I would always apologise to her 
afterwards’.  
 
In a number of cases, domestic violence diminished over time: sons grew older and were 
able to restrain their fathers and fathers themselves grew older. Hafiza had not only suffered 
a great deal of violence for producing one daughter after another, but was also forced to 
accept her husband’s decision to take a second wife in the hope of a son. This did not 
happen and after a while, his violence abated. One reason for this was the novel way that 
Hafiza had found of satisfying his desire for a son which was to dress – and treat – one of 
her daughters as a boy until she reached adolescence: ‘it makes his heart happy’.  
 
In Naghma’s case, however, the violence had not abated4 but appeared to be passing on to 
the next generation. She told us how her daughter sometimes sought to intervene when she 
was being beaten by her husband: ‘she tells her father, ‘don’t beat my mother, don’t beat my 
mother’ and she tries to stop him but he pushes her away. My sons don’t try to stop him but 
they cry’. However, one of her sons had started to beat his sister when he got angry. When 
she remonstrated with him, he replied, ‘she is a girl. I have to do this’. 
 
Unlike Pareesha’s husband, Naghma’s husband did not appear to have any qualms about 
his use of violence to deal with conflict:  
 
Sometimes I deal with the problem by just smiling. Sometimes I deal with it by beating 
her hard. With women sometimes the solution is just to beat them hard. Sometimes I 
buy her a gift.  
 
One other factor that appeared to secure women’s submission to patriarchal authority within 
the family was the importance they attached to their relationships with their children. It was 
for their children that many women welcomed the opportunity to earn a living and it was on 
their children that they spent much of the money at their disposal. The moodiness, bad 
temper and violence displayed by many of the men in our sample often drove a wedge 
between children and their fathers and it was to their mothers that many turned. This 
appeared to be the case even when, as in the case of Pareesha, they were step-children. 
She told us: ‘I am the one they come to. I don’t want to compliment myself but it is me who is 
their support at home. They respect me. I respect them too. I would do anything for them’. 
 
Fear of losing their children was what led some women to resign themselves to the violence 
of their marriages. Since women have no custodial rights to their children, to leave a violent 
or abusive husband was to leave their children. As Layla said: ‘I love my children, my 
children are everything to me, I would never leave them. We had a fight once and he told me 
to go if I wanted. I said, I will never leave my children’.  
 
                                                 
4  Her conflicting relationship with her husband had been exacerbated by his affair with a woman living nearby. 
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Naghma had been advised by her parents and sister to leave her violent husband. She 
explained why she had not taken their advice:  
 
I really love my children. I can’t leave him because of them… I feel I am a coward. 
Some people would face up to him but I don’t. I am scared my life would be ruined… I 
am scared of losing my family. My husband never swallows his pride. I am scared that 
he will … take my children from me … he will tell me to go to my father’s home… I pray 
to God for my husband’s behaviour to change. I really have no other wish but that. 
Sometimes I think I am very stupid, what is there for me to stay for in this house? But I 
love my family.  
 
4.3 Rights, responsibilities and the moral community  
If the unequal power dynamics of marriage and family life make it difficult for women to 
challenge perceived injustices within the family, the pressure to accept their fate is reinforced 
by their social isolation. For all the closeness of their family relationships, many of the women 
in our sample appeared to be lonely. Almost none of them spoke of friends of their own who 
they might turn to in times of trouble. Most of them turned to elders within the family or 
religious figures. As Nadia’s mother told us:  
 
When there is a problem, we go to our elders, our ‘white beards’. We don’t know 
anything about the police or human rights. My children are just doing their carpet 
weaving, I am in my own world.  
 
Others would seek solace in their faith or as Farah put it, ‘keep it inside themselves’. There is 
little in any of these options to encourage them to question the justice of the prevailing order.  
 
As might be expected, relationships with abusive or violent husbands constitute a major 
source of stress and depression in the lives of many women. Pareesha recalled the early 
years in Kabul after her family returned from Iran when her husband had no work, took out 
his frustrations on her and she no family of her own to support her: ‘I would think God has 
turned his back on me. No money, no job, being lonely… If there had been someone I could 
have talked to at least… I was not allowed to go out either’. She had on one occasion turned 
to her husband’s parents for support, but had been told: ‘You have to tolerate it’.  
 
Safa had gone to her doctor because she wanted advice on divorcing her husband. He had 
first advised her to go to the government or to the mullah but when he realised she was 
pregnant, told her that divorce was out of the question. Naghma had turned to her own family 
for advice on how to deal with her husband and they had sought to intervene on her behalf. 
As a result, her husband had forbidden her to have any further contact with them.  
 
It was to their faith that almost all the women in our sample turned in times of trouble or need 
but here they made a very clear distinction between different aspects of religion. There was a 
remarkably unanimous mistrust of mullahs. Pareesha only went to a mullah to clarify some 
aspect of religious etiquette: ‘we are Shias, how should we behave with Ismailis, should we 
eat with them?’. Jamila might go if she reached a dead end with her doctor, ‘if we reach a 
dead end, we go to the mullah, if my child is sick, I might go the mullah, he will give me a 
taviz or tell me to go to the doctor’.  
 
Otherwise, most of the women were scathing in their comments:  
 
I think mullahs are a waste of money. In my opinion you should ask for your needs 
from God or from a shrine, not from a mullah. They make fun of the Quran. They 
write prayers and they wrap it up and give it to you (in an amulet). Some people are 
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desperate and have not had their needs met so they go to the Mullah in the hope 
that he can do something for them. (Pareesha) 
 
I don’t go to the mullah. I don’t believe in him, I don’t like him. I think he lies. He is 
not from God… I think they say they are pure but they are not as pure as they say. I 
think academics5 are better than mullahs. (Saeeda)  
 
I don’t go to the mullah, why should you go to the mullah. Whatever is in your heart 
is right. When you have a need, you go to the shrine. Or I go to the mosque – that is 
God’s home. (Nadia)  
 
Instead the women turned to other forms of religious support and advice. A number of the 
women cited the teachings of prominent religious clerics like Mohsini, Iman Khomeini and 
Mohaqiq Kabuli, as providing their moral compass. Mohsini has his own TV channel which is 
an important source of information on religious matters. Both Farah and Saeeda welcomed 
his proposed legislation on Shia personal law which seeks to uphold male authority and 
responsibility within marriage and represents an interpretation of Islamic law that would 
enhance the security of married women. Farah could not understand why some women had 
demonstrated against the legislation and had demanded that women should be as free as 
men: ‘How is it possible for a women to go out without her husbands’ permission?’.  
 
But it is their pilgrimages to local shrines, a long standing custom among the Hazara 
community, which women cited most frequently as a source of peace, solace and support. A 
number of them distinguished between the formality of the mosque and the relaxed 
spirituality and sociability of the shrine. While the mosque was seen as the house of God, a 
place for formal prayers on holy days, it was not a place where these women seemed to feel 
comfortable. Instead it was the shrine they went to when there was a problem in the family or 
when they needed comfort.  
 
Hafiza said:  
 
I don’t have anyone here, my sister is in Iran. Women do not have anywhere to go, 
there is no one in the mosque they can talk to. When my husband gets angry I go to 
the shrine. Or when I want something from God. I go whenever I have time.  
 
A number of them spoke of the sense of community they felt at the shrine. As Layla put it: ‘I 
don’t need anyone but God. In the shrines, there are needy people, you can cook and 
distribute to them’. 
 
According to Pareesha:  
 
I pray, I pray for my children. I went to the shrine of Shah Ghubad last year. It really 
fulfils your needs. We went to ask for the health of my nephew, he is crippled. It was a 
beautiful place and we had a good time there. I go the shrine of the Twelve Imams 
every day to pray for the prosperity of my shop. I pray that my husband’s temper 
changes.  
 
 
                                                 
5  Presumably with reference to the interviewers. 
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5  Questioning patriarchal norms: forces for 
change in women’s lives  
 
As the preceding discussion suggests, there are powerful forces buttressing patriarchal 
structures in Afghanistan and seeking to restrict women’s capacity to challenge, or even, 
question patriarchal norms. At the same time, Afghanistan is a society that has been 
undergoing major changes, particularly in recent decades, changes which have had major 
repercussions on patterns of gender relations in everyday life. While the most recent major 
change was the Allied invasion, the overthrow of the Taliban and their replacement by the 
Karzai regime, this had been preceded by many years of war, disruption and exile. Long-
established ways of organising gender relations could be evaluated critically because of 
exposure to other ways of organising these relations, ways that did not necessarily appear 
‘western’ or ‘alien’ to Afghan culture. As a result, what may otherwise have been taken for 
granted as the natural moral order by women who have been described as among the most 
excluded in an increasingly integrated world (Moghadam 2002: 19) was becoming the 
subject of the competing discourses of justice and morality to which ordinary women had 
access.  
 
5.1 Migration and the reflexive vantage point: ‘life was better in Iran’ 
One major source of change was the large-scale displacement of the population as a result 
of the war and the associated urbanisation of what had been a largely rural population. Many 
Afghans, and Hazaras among them, had gone to live in Iran for varying periods of time. 
Others had gone to refugee camps in Pakistan. They did not go back to their villages on their 
return but made their way to Kabul to seek a living. A large percentage of this displaced 
population was female. For many, this was their first experience of what it meant to live in, or 
near, a city, including access to water, roads, markets, jobs, health services and schools.  
 
In addition, for the women in our sample, and for some of the men, the experience of having 
lived outside of Afghanistan for a number of years had given them a reflexive distance from 
which to evaluate their own society and to compare it with the different realities that prevailed 
in other Muslim countries. The expression of the view that ‘life was better in Iran’ was one of 
the surprising refrains that ran through a number of their narratives. However, the reasons 
they gave had little to do with religion per se: rather they appeared to reflect the value that 
women attached to the benefits that came from being part of a functioning state.  
 
It was evident that women believed that Iran not only offered more genuine security of life 
and livelihoods but better education and mobility for women and a higher standard of living. It 
was also considered to be a society that respects and delivers on women’s rights, where 
police can be relied on for protection. Naghma had first-hand experience of this. She had 
complained to the police about her husband’s violence when they lived in Iran. The police 
had come to their house and forced him to apologise. He had behaved better for two months 
but had then gone back to his old behaviour. Now that they were back in Afghanistan where 
he had his entire family around him, she saw no point seeking external help for fear he would 
simply take away her children.  
 
Pareesha held Iran up as a model for Afghanistan. She believed that it was superior because 
it allowed women greater freedom of movement outside the home than Afghan society did:  
 
If women stay at home, the country will regress. Men cannot have ideas all by 
themselves. Iranians look down on Afghans but they respect the Japanese and 
Koreans because both women and men try to make their country. 
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She also said that she had learnt to value daughters during her time in Iran: ‘The Afghans 
celebrate when a boy is born. I think if a girl is born, she should be celebrated. What is the 
difference? I now have two beautiful daughters. I love them very much’. She also felt that 
others around her had been changed by their exposure to different realities:  
 
men can no longer put pressure. Some men have seen the world… People have 
communicated with other people. They have sought refuge in other countries and have 
changed. When you meet different people, you realise things.  
 
Safa held similar views about the status of women and girls in Iran. She herself was illiterate 
but she saw how so many girls went to school: ‘When we went to Iran, I didn’t want to come 
back. When I went there, I started to know the world’. She had also learnt different values: 
she had been beating her child in a park in Iran and was stopped by a group of students who 
told her she should never beat a child. But she saw these changes in others in her society: 
men had also learnt from living away from Afghanistan. Even her mother told her ‘the time for 
beating children with an electric cable is long past – you should advise them instead’. Wafa 
believed it was only a matter of time before things improved in Afghanistan: ‘In ten years 
Afghanistan will be like Iran and women will have freedom and security’.  
 
5.2 After the Taliban: the freedoms of everyday life  
Within Afghanistan itself, the fall of the Taliban and its replacement by the Karzai government 
brought a number of important changes in its wake, both removal of the various restrictions 
that had been imposed by the Taliban and the launch of major efforts on the part of the 
international community to construct a modern democratic state in Afghanistan. For all the 
limitations and compromises made by the Karzai government, it was welcomed by the 
women in our sample because it was seen to have given political representation to their 
community for the first time in history. They also associated it with visible evidence of 
progress: the availability of gas and electricity, the asphalting of roads, the increase in 
economic activity, improved access to the media, particularly television, and the proliferation 
of development NGOs, including the microfinance organisations to be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
The women were able to look back on the past from the vantage point of the present. It is 
evident from what they said that, with one exception, none of the women and men in our 
sample believed that the repressive model of gender relations associated with the Taliban 
resonated with their own interpretations of religion and culture. When they described life in 
the Taliban era, they often described it in terms of fear. According to Safa: ‘We were all 
scared then. When I went out somewhere, I would come back quickly so that they could not 
hurt me’. Parwana spoke of how ‘at that time, we used to fall a lot’ because they had to wear 
the encompassing burqa when they went out. Farah remembered that they could not even 
go on pilgrimage to holy shrines: ‘They would beat you. During the Taliban regime, women 
were worth nothing’. Jamila spoke of the fear that kept working women at home as well as 
boys because they feared for their lives: ‘nothing could be done because of the Taliban, 
people’s hands and feet were tied’. 
 
Only Hafiza offered any positive assessment of the Taliban:  
 
The Taliban were good for women, women had to observe their Islamic hijab. They 
would lash those who did not cover themselves. It was worse for men, they would 
harass the men, they would lash them. Now everybody is uncovered.  
 
Her husband too, while he condemned many aspects of the Taliban years (‘when the Taliban 
came to power, neither men nor women were ‘alive’. When a man is not alive, a woman is 
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not alive too, especially for Shi’a people’), nevertheless believed that they had upheld the 
rule of law: ‘in the taxi, there was a curtain between men and women; men and women were 
separate’. 
 
If the recurring theme in the women’s narratives of the Taliban era was fear, the word that 
summarises the difference between ‘then’ and ‘now’ is freedom. This is not freedom in any 
absolute sense of the word but in relation to the past. It refers to the ordinary freedoms that 
men and women in much of the world, including neighbouring countries, take for granted but 
that has been denied to Afghan citizens by both the earlier Mujahadeen regime as well as 
the Taliban who succeeded them. The women, in particular, valued their newly regained 
freedom of movement and the other freedoms that came with it: 
 
Since the Taliban left, we have been free. Now we wear the chador namoz. We can go 
out freely. We can go shopping. My daughters can go to school. Men can go and work 
in peace. The Taliban did not let girls study. Now I see on TV that girls go to karate 
class. Freedom is good, anyone can go out with honour. Now people are happy, they 
go to school and work. Best is children can go to school, people can make a living in 
peace. Our streets have asphalt. I see on TV that women are doing tailoring and carpet 
weaving, these are very important. (Jamila) 
 
Women are freer now, people are freer. Women wear better clothes, they can go to the 
bazaar, they can sit in a car with a man. If they want, they can wear a headscarf or 
they can go out with uncovered hair. Girls can go to schools, literate women can admit 
they are literate and work in organisations. Now men and women vote equally. Women 
can be proud because they can work. The government is looking after women. (Farah) 
 
Women have more freedom. Now I can go out freely. It is important for me. I don’t want 
to be confined… Now everyone can go out wearing what they want. People are free 
now. They can study. Since the time of the Mujahadin, no one was able to study… 
Even infants can study now. (Safa) 
 
Nadia’s mother compared women’s enforced financial dependence on men during the 
Taliban era: ‘They only ate. They were relying on men to bring money home… only men 
could work’ – with their present opportunities: ‘Now you eat from what you can earn, you can 
function independently... Now there are jobs for women, you can work in agriculture, in 
organisations. People now have hope. At that time I covered my face. Now I keep it 
uncovered. The weather is hot and I can’t see in front of me’. 
 
Nadia agreed: ‘It is better now, there is more freedom, girls are working in the doctor’s 
offices, they go to the bazaar, it is good for them. Both women and men can work now, 
people can walk freely, they can go to school, they can be teachers, women could not be 
teachers before. And it is OK if we go out without socks’. 
 
5.3 Legal discourses of equality and rights  
The renewed focus on governance structures in the period of post-war reconstruction led to 
the expansion in opportunities for political participation and the emergence of a more 
legalistic discourse of equality and alternative jurisdictions to those of kinship and 
community. Ordinary women were exposed to these ideas through their interactions with 
neighbours, customers and microfinance organisations as well as through the media. The TV 
in particular, an important channel through which women learnt about what was happening in 
the larger world, was also the medium through which parallel discourses about rights and 
responsibilities were communicated to the Afghan population. Along with conservative 
discourses rooted in the moral economy of kinship, community and faith and actively 
disseminated by religious figures like Mohsini, the TV exposed them to a new liberal 
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discourse around gender equality promoted by the international community through an aid-
dependent government.  
 
Women’s views about this emerging discourse on gender were not uniform. For some, it 
merely contributed to the erosion of past constraints and greater laxity around women’s 
behaviour. Others were far more positive about the emerging discourse on women’s rights 
because it allowed them to question the gender asymmetries embedded in customary norms 
and traditions. Despite the normative model of mutual rights and responsibilities spelt out by 
the classic patriarchal contract, the reality was that men appeared to have a monopoly of 
rights and privileges while women bore the main burden of responsibilities. Nor was there 
any realistic prospect within the moral economy of kinship and religion of holding men to 
account for the abuse of their privileges.  
 
From this perspective, the legal discourse around women’s rights appeared to rectify some of 
the imbalances of classic patriarchy. This was nicely illustrated by Safa’s views. She drew on 
religion to talk about men’s rights: ‘From a religious point of view, we say husbands have 
rights. We should not disrespect husbands. Some are good, some are not. I respect my 
husband a lot. I pour him tea, I wash his clothes, I fulfil my duties’. But when asked about 
women’s rights, she spoke of the new jurisdiction as holding men to account:  
 
Men were not scared before but now they are. I tell my husband, if you beat me, I will 
report you… Now women are being paid attention to, husbands care about their wives. 
Violence against women had come down because people were scared to go to jail. I 
watch it on TV. You can see if women are oppressed, men are punished.  
 
This view that the emerging discourse of women’s rights constituted a restraint on male 
power was held by a number of women. It was expounded at some length and most 
eloquently by Pareesha. She spoke of men’s ability to exercise absolute power over women 
in the past: ‘A woman did not have any rights. She did not have any courage. Even if she 
was likely to be killed, she did not have the right to complain… if a woman brought up the 
subject of divorce, she would be killed’. She resented the way that religion had been used to 
uphold men’s monopoly of rights and believed that there had to be some way of making men 
more accountable for their actions: ‘there has to be a force on men. If there isn’t, awful things 
happen to women…’. In her view, the setting up of the Human Rights Commission and a 
police force that was willing to intervene on behalf of women were a move in this direction: ‘ 
 
It is better now because women can go and complain if there is violence and the man 
will be in trouble. If my husband beats me and I am at fault, for example, if I go out 
without his permission, I accept it. But if I am in beaten in this place where I have no 
family, without being at fault, then I have to go and complain. So they can ask him, 
why? What did you see to beat her?… I haven’t been there but they support women’s 
rights. The husband cannot make her do things… The government has brought these 
changes. Before, it was better for a woman to die than to get a divorce. Now there is a 
slogan that God says as long as there is a right to marry, there is a right to divorce.  
 
Of the 12 women in our sample, Pareesha was also the most forthright in her support for 
equal rights:  
 
Everybody has to have rights. There shouldn’t be any difference. It is not right that only 
men should have rights. Are women not also creatures of God? If only my husband 
would just say to me, ‘OK I don’t mind what you are doing’, it would be like the world 
had been given to me. I would work hard for my children, I would make halal money... 
 
However, others also expressed the view that the rights discourse was beginning to have an 
effect. While Saeeda believed that her husband beat her less now that her sons were grown 
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up, her neighbour’s view was that there had been a generalised reduction of violence: ‘They 
can’t because you see on TV that women have rights and men cannot beat them’.  
 
Parwana had begun to question the absolute authority that religion and custom appeared to 
have bestowed on men:  
 
Rights are something you have to defend. You cannot only accept whatever your 
husband tells you. You should fight. A woman has the right to work. There are women 
in Afghanistan who do not have the right to go to their parents’ home. A woman has the 
right to say, ‘my mother and father should be respected’. God has given these rights to 
women and husbands should accept them. Men have all the rights. They can have 
unlimited wives, they have control over life and everything. Islam has given all these 
rights to men. I agree with these rights to some extent and to some extent I don’t. I 
don’t like a man to have control over everything. If my husband forbids me to work, I 
would try and resolve it through good behaviour. If he forbids me to see my parents, I 
would try to solve it through discussion. If I can’t, I would ask an elder to solve it.  
 
Naghma despaired that her husband would ever change his behaviour towards her. She 
continued to see women’s rights as conditional on husbands’ approval and her dutiful 
behaviour:  
 
Women to some extent should be able to know what rights are. She has to consult her 
husband, then she can get the rights. Not to be reprimanded, to be able to work, these 
are her rights. But I don’t mean that she should ignore her husband or family.  
 
But she questioned the justice of husbands who used their power without regard for how 
their wives might feel:  
 
...when she works hard at home, there should be kindness towards her. If I am beaten, 
my heart is broken. My right is that I should be able to ask my husband, ‘Why am I 
guilty?’. I pray to God that he can tell me what has happened. Why don’t I have the 
right to choose my own clothes or to go to my parents’ house? A woman is not an 
animal.  
 
In addition, she shared the widely expressed belief that at the general level, there had been 
some improvement in the lives of women: ‘Back then women were like slaves. Now they 
have better lives, they have authority’. She regarded the ability to vote to be the most 
important change in women’s lives: ‘you are considered a person and women are recognised 
as human beings’. She knew that the law gave women more rights than before and that there 
was a commission that they could go to with their complaints. She believed that the women’s 
organisations active in the country had been a major force in modifying men’s ability to 
restrict women’s freedoms – although she added that ‘too much freedom is not good either’. 
She believed that violence against women had decreased along with the many other 
customs that restricted women’s behaviour, possibly because of these organisations that 
supported women. She cited the example of her sister who had learnt about her rights from 
the TV and had been able to stand up to an oppressive mother-in-law by threatening to 
complain to a women’s rights organisation.  
 
 
 23 
 
6  Microfinance as a pathway of change: 
expanding economic opportunities 
 
Among the various changes associated with the international community’s efforts to promote 
the local economy in Afghanistan is the proliferation of microfinance organisations. The 
availability of microfinance specifically earmarked for women is a new phenomenon in 
Afghanistan but there are various ways in which women’s access is qualified. While both 
BRAC and WfW target their loans to women, both explicitly require husbands’ consent. 
Husbands have to be present when the women join the programme; have to submit their 
fingerprints along with their wives’; supply photographs and house deeds, where available, or 
a guarantor otherwise. This both ensures that men can be held responsible for loan 
repayment and serves to make the policy of targeting women more acceptable to male 
members. The effect of these terms and conditions is to transform a purportedly ‘woman’s 
loan’ into a joint or even ‘male’ one.  
 
It was generally the men in our sample households who took the initiative to approach these 
organisations, urging their wives to take advantage of this new facility. That this was so, 
despite norms about female seclusion and the primacy of the male breadwinning role, is 
indicative of the economic pressures that the households were under in a context of high 
levels of male unemployment. In most cases, the loans were used to set men up in income-
generating activities – a taxi business, small trade, raising poultry or livestock, purchase of a 
carpet weaving loom, setting up a shop or financing training to prepare sons for the labour 
market.  
 
Only in a few cases had women been able to use the loan to finance an independent 
economic activity for themselves, sometimes after considerable negotiation with their 
husbands if the work entailed their presence in the public domain – such as running a bakery 
or their own hairdressing business. In a number of households, sons and daughters had 
been able to find jobs within the microfinance organisation. Pareesha’s daughter had argued, 
successfully, with her father to be allowed to work in a BRAC office as she did not want to 
marry early: ‘Dear father, I am not a girl, I am your oldest ‘son’, people don’t have the right to 
say anything. If I don’t work, I will have to marry’.  
 
In general, the loans helped families to secure their livelihood base and diversify their 
livelihoods, in some cases, helping them to move up the livelihood ladder. For instance, 
Nadia’s father shifted out of daily wage labour into his own vegetable business while the 
women in his family moved from carpet weaving for a contractor on a piece rate basis to 
working on their own loom. From the women’s perspective, using their loans in this way had 
the benefit of helping their husbands to fulfil their breadwinning responsibilities. For Nadia, it 
also had the benefit of getting the men out of the house and freeing women to get on with 
their own work: ‘It is a good thing my father is not at home. There is no one to keep saying, 
‘bring me my food’. When my father is at home, that is all what he wants’. 
 
There were a number of cases where failure to use the loans productively had plunged the 
family into deeper debt. ‘Bad’ loans generally had ‘bad’ impacts on intra-household relations. 
Layla’s first loan had been used to release her brother-in-law from prison as the result of an 
accident involving her husband’s taxi. They relied on their small shop to repay the loan but 
had not managed and were now trying to juggle three different loans from three different 
organisations. Layla’s husband’s shouting had increased as a result of the stress he was 
going through leaving her to conclude that ‘the loans have ruined our life’. 
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Naz had a similarly negative experience. One of her loans had been used to set her husband 
up as a money changer but he had been robbed on the way home. They were now in deep 
debt and not sure how to get out of it. She was in a state of constant stress about her loan 
repayments: ‘Something you think can bring benefit for people’s life has not made our life 
better. If we had not taken the loan, the thief would not have taken the money. My husband 
blames me for taking the loan’. 
 
For the other women in our sample, access to microfinance had generally made a positive 
contribution to household livelihoods. However, the extent to which it had also contributed to 
their capacity for voice and influence varied considerably, reflecting the different ways in 
which their loans were controlled and utilised and the extent to which they served to expand 
women’s sphere of social interaction and exposure to new ideas.  
 
In Saeeda’s case, access to loans appeared to have little impact, positive or negative. She 
had gone to BRAC for a loan on her husband’s instructions and he had used the money to 
clear his debt and to buy a battery for his taxi. As far as she was concerned, there was little 
additional impact: ‘My husband’s problems are solved so my problems are solved’.  
 
Parwana already had a full-time job as a security guard in a local business while her 
husband worked as a mechanic for an international agency. Her loans were invested by her 
husband in poultry and then livestock which she and her children took care of. They took 
turns paying off the loan: ‘sometimes I pay, sometimes he does, there is no difference. This 
is married life’. While microfinance had clearly helped them to diversify their household 
livelihood base, it was her job, and what it allowed her to do, that she appeared to value 
most.  
 
Naghma’s evaluation of her experience was a mixed one, partly as the result of her 
conflictual relationship with her husband. She had taken loans on her husband’s instruction. 
He was unemployed and the money was used to set him up in a tailoring business. As far as 
the loans were concerned, therefore, she saw little evidence of impact: ‘There has been no 
difference for me. I just give the money to my husband. I don’t keep a single penny for myself 
… whatever I do, there is no change in his behaviour’. However, there were a number of 
ways in which she had benefited. One was the opportunity to make regular visits to the WfW 
office to pay her instalments and to discuss some of her marital problems with the women 
there. However, after a while, her husband forbade these visits and decided to go in her 
place. When the WfW staff raised objections, he decided to stop taking any more loans. 
 
She also benefited in another way. With the expansion of her husbands’ tailoring business, 
she began to make waistcoats for her husband for which she received payments. This was, 
as she acknowledged, an unusual arrangement but she explained it as a husband’s 
contribution to meeting his wife’s needs. This income had allowed her to pay for her 
daughter’s education. As she put it, ‘You know that men don’t really care about girls’. Her 
husband had been willing to pay for their sons to go to a private school but not their 
daughter. So she used her ‘wages’ to send her daughter to school: ‘I want Mahdiya to be 
someone, not to sit at home all day like her mother sewing clothes’.  
 
For other women, access to microfinance had been a more unambiguously positive 
experience. Not only had it contributed to household goals and living standards but also had 
a number of impacts at the personal level. A number of them had been able to use the 
increased income flows into the household to achieve goals that they valued: securing the 
tenure of their homes, educating children, hospitality to guests, participation in social 
networks, capacity to pay for marriage-related expenses vital to their reputation and social 
standing. Children’s education was one of the most important of these goals and having 
some income of their own allowed women to send daughters to school, something their 
fathers did not always prioritise.  
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A number of women believed that access to microfinance had increased their say in 
household finances, reinforced in certain cases, by their entry into paid work. Farah enjoyed 
the small measure of economic independence that her embroidery and carpet weaving 
income gave her: ‘I feel happy I can buy things for myself, I have my own responsibilities, I 
can do embroidery, I can do carpet weaving’. Nadia’s mother approved of the fact that loans 
were given to women:  
 
A woman does not generally have authority, the loan gives them more authority… If 
men were given the money, they would work in the bazaar, they would get a job 
outside the house and we would not be able to weave carpets.  
 
Safa expressed a similar viewpoint. While she agreed that it was a good idea that men had 
to approve their wives taking out loans because they could then be held responsible for the 
loans and also because women were not in possession of the relevant information; she also 
felt that directing the loans through women gave them some say in how the money was 
used. In her case, her ability to access loans had only become possible with the departure of 
her oppressive mother-in-law. She thanked God for her improved fortunes: ‘I felt my old brain 
is gone and I have a new brain. Our shop is new, our home is new… Back then I could not 
plan for anything and I tended to forget things’. Her husband’s behaviour had also changed, 
he was less suspicious of her going out and he contributed his earnings to the joint 
management of the household. He had bought Safa a mobile phone so that he did not have 
to worry about her when she was out.  
 
Jamila’s loans had been invested well and now she, her husband and her son were all 
working. They were able to offer hospitality to guests and their standing in the community 
had risen. Jamila believed that she had improved her position within the family:  
 
Before I took loans, I was a housewife. Now I have control over the whole house, I 
didn’t use to have authority, now I do. I am more respected now. My husband used to 
shout. Now I have a better status… He says, ‘you are the wakil [wise woman]. You 
know what to do’. When we were poor, we had nothing. When he got angry, he started 
shouting but now he respects me a lot. The loan has not created a burden for me. If I 
had done it alone, I would have been anxious… Now if there is a problem, they come 
to me… I have peace both inside and outside my home.  
 
Jamila’s daughter supported her claim: ‘my father respects my mother a lot and always tells 
her to sit here on the cushions, not there on the floor’.  
 
Like some of the other women in our sample, Jamila attributed many of the impacts she had 
experienced at the personal level and in her relations with others to the fact that the loans 
were targeted to her:  
 
If my husband had made more money without need for my loans, I would have no 
authority. They would keep the money. Now they give it to me. My son gives me his 
whole salary. Freedom means freedom to spend money. If my husband made money, 
he would keep it. And if he keeps it, how can I have more freedom? Now I go wherever 
I want and I have money. If I like something, I buy it. If the money is with the man, he 
won’t give it for the children, he won’t give it to you. 
 
A number of women spoke of the expanded social interaction associated with their access to 
microfinance. Those associated with WfW spoke of their regular visits to what Nadia 
described as ‘an office full of women, all with different stories’. Her visits to the market also 
brought her in contact with new ideas: ‘When I go to market, I have heard that now men and  
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women are equal’. Farah had been taking her repayments to the WfW office every 15 days 
for the last four years and she enjoyed the opportunities for social interaction it had opened 
up:  
 
I go out and talk to my sisters. I see different people. I get to know good people. I see 
their lives are good. We share our problems. I like it when I learn about people’s lives. 
There are three of us in our loan group, my mother-in-law, my sister-in-law and myself. 
We get to see those other women clients. They talk about financial matters, about who 
is married…  
 
For Naghma too, until she was forbidden by her husband, visits to the WfW office had 
provided her with people to talk to about her problems:  
 
I know the people in the WfW office and they know me. We have a good relationship 
and I confide in them and I feel better. Sometimes when I went there I had a black eye 
or some injury, they would get very angry… I like hanging about with them – you can 
confide in them and talk to them. I hear strange things about family life. They share 
their problems.  
 
In Jamila’s case, her loan group met every Wednesday in her house. They would discuss 
their loans and their businesses but there would also be exchange of personal problems:  
 
They tell their stories, they talk about their children. If it weren’t for these meetings, I 
would not know that one of our neighbours is going crazy, she is in hospital. We meet 
with our cousins from our mother’s side, the cousins from our father’s side… they come 
here, we drink tea together, we talk, we confide in each other. 
 
Others spoke of the expansions of their social interactions through the work they did. It had 
been Pareesha’s idea to get a microfinance loan in order to open her own hairdressing 
business, using the skills she had learnt while in Iran. When she had first returned to Kabul 
with her husband, she missed the sociability of her life as a hairdresser, first in Mashhad and 
then in Teheran. She had a lot of customers who came to visit her regularly. When they 
returned to Kabul, she knew nobody: no one would even knock on their door. Once she set 
up her hairdressing business with her microfinance loan, she felt she had grown in self 
confidence as a result of her increased contacts with the outside world:  
 
I feel comfortable, I can interact with people… The hairdressers is the best place to 
have a chance to talk to other women like myself. Everybody has their own problems 
especially because Afghan men are so cruel… Women ask me for help. My assistant 
had a problem with her husband who couldn’t provide for her. She wanted a divorce 
but I advised her to get a loan. 
 
She felt that since she became economically active in her own right, her relationship with her 
husband had improved:  
 
At least we don’t argue over money any more. He feels better too… There have been 
fewer arguments, there has been less fighting because everyone has money in their 
pocket. My husband still has the authority. I respect him a lot. I consult him... But now it 
is better – he lets me do what I want… I used to fight him because he could not provide 
for us. I can help him now, earn my household expenses and pay for the rent and 
materials… I can pay for my own expenses so the violence has reduced. I feel proud, I 
am not dependent, I am not asking others for money. I have a feeling of joy… My 
husband’s behaviour changed, he is happy I am standing on my own two feet… 
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Sometimes he praises me as he thinks it was courageous of me to take a loan. I have 
the feeling of growing up and becoming a fuller person. I am no longer sitting at home. 
I feel like I am a man… At nights my husband asks how my day was. He gets a 
cushion for me. He gives me food. It is very unusual. People encourage me. They say I 
have done things that even men couldn’t do. Women that are at home say that too. 
Other women who take loans give it to their husbands, but I used mine on my own 
business. Some might call my husband without honour, but my husband is different 
now that he is no longer in contact with others who influence him. Also he is proud. He 
tells other men to treat their wives better although he treated me wrong in the past. He 
gave advice to his neighbour to treat his wife with more respect.  
 
Pareesha’s husband acknowledged some of these changes. He told us that his wife 
sometimes used the loan money without consulting him: ‘This drives me crazy and we have 
to bargain with each other’. It is clear that he does not always overrule her. As she put it, 
‘Either I win or he wins’. He feels a greater sense of confidence in the future as a result of 
access to microfinance:  
 
I became a little more ‘intellectual’, it has changed the way I think… What I mean is 
that now I know that if I am faced with a problem, the loan will help me to solve it. I now 
believe that my life should get better, my children should go to school, my wife should 
work.  
 
At the same time, he continues to see himself as having final authority in the household, a 
reflection of the natural order of things:  
 
Afghanistan is a patriarchal society; whatever men say goes. Look, if you see the TV, 
there is a buffalo that controls all the other buffalos or a lion who controls other lions. It 
is necessary to have this. It is the same for human beings… 
 
Hafiza had started her own bakery (she used to bake in her homeland) because her husband 
was disabled and could not work. His initial resistance faded when he saw the economic 
benefits of her work. He stopped beating her as she now responded by threatening not to go 
into work, ‘He knows if he beats me, I can’t bake, I would have a headache, my body would 
ache, I would not be able to work’. But she felt his behaviour had in any case improved over 
time:  
 
There is a lot of difference. The money is mine. He is better now, he is gradually better. 
He has been around and seen things, he has learnt. You don’t learn when you are 
sitting at home. He has seen people. He has seen that people work. He says, how 
would we be able to eat if there was not this bakery. It would be very difficult.  
 
She felt she had the respect of her neighbours. They saw that she worked hard, ‘If she was 
not there, this man would not be able to make a living’. She herself had grown in self-
confidence. She contrasted how she had been with how she was now:  
 
At that time, I didn’t go anywhere. I didn’t know where to go. I didn’t know how to keep 
my money. I was scared I would lose it that someone would take it. I neither knew the 
school nor the classes nor the bazaar. Now I have learnt… Now I know my way 
around, I would get lost before… [now] I go around more freely.   
 
And she valued the opportunity to mix with others, to learn about life too:  
 
You learn stories from the bakery, for example girls should go to school. When you 
come from your homeland, you don’t know anything. Then you learn. He has been to 
places too. He has learnt. It is good because people gather around you, there is money  
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and I don’t have to beg. I hear people say, that person’s wife is capable. When I go to 
repay the loan, I become familiar with other people. The house is full. People talk, you 
have to talk.  
 
Her daughter confirmed the change in her mother, ‘back then she was weak. She didn’t know 
anything. She feels powerful now’.  
 
 
7  Interpreting the narratives: renegotiating 
patriarchal contracts in an era of rapid change  
 
In this paper we set out to explore working women’s narratives about their lives in order to 
ascertain what they valued about the place allocated to them by society and the extent to 
which they sought, or welcomed, change and what these changes were. We were interested 
in examining how these narratives positioned women in relation to the larger debate about 
desirable pathways of change. We were also interested in the factors which reproduced 
gender inequalities in women’s lives – as well as the forces for positive change. Finally, we 
wanted to explore the extent to which microfinance contributed to some of the changes that 
we observed in women’s lives.  
 
We found that women in our sample spoke of gender relations in their everyday lives in 
terms of the idea of an informal patriarchal contract. This spelt out a gender-differentiated 
discourse of rights and responsibilities between women and men within family and kinship 
relations which had its roots in religion and culture. Many had internalised aspects of this 
contract. They defined virtue in women in terms of their compliance with the wishes and 
expectations of dominant family members and recognising the right of husbands to beat their 
wives for any transgressions. In return, they expected women to be provided for, protected in 
times of crisis and represented in the public domain.  
 
However, the lived reality rarely matched up to the idealised version spelt out in religious 
teachings and cultural codes. Instead, women’s narratives about their everyday lives were 
dominated by their efforts to discharge their obligations as daughters, wives, mothers and 
daughters-in-law in the context of a disrupted economy with high levels of unemployment in 
which male family members were finding it hard to live up to their roles as primary 
breadwinners and venting their frustrations on their wives and children. Women’s struggles to 
deal with the disjuncture between this normative model of a patriarchal contract and its 
concrete manifestations in their daily lives helped to spell out some of the forces of continuity 
and change that have characterised Afghan society in recent decades.  
 
On the one hand, we noted the variety of pressures on women to accept their subordinate 
status and to put up with their situation, regardless of how they felt. The weight of tradition, 
the internalisation of inferiority, the fear of losing their children, of being sent back in shame 
to their parents’ home, of being expelled from family and community combined with 
pressures, often backed by physical violence, from dominant members of the family and the 
wider religious community in reinforcing the status quo. Even someone like Naz who wished 
that she had the power to fight back and had told her husband she hoped ‘he would die 
young’ nevertheless told herself that she had no choice, she was a woman and had to 
tolerate it. For all the closeness of family ties, many of these women spoke of their 
loneliness, of not having anyone to confide in. The significance of shrines in their lives was 
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that they offered them a place where they could be themselves, where they found spiritual 
strength and solace that was not easy to find elsewhere in their lives.  
 
Yet it is clear men too have found the burden of responsibility associated with their position in 
the household difficult to deal with in the aftermath of decades of upheaval. The stresses 
they have had to face can be glimpsed in their descriptions of their struggles to discharge 
their responsibilities. They can also be glimpsed in women’s descriptions of their husbands 
as ‘bad tempered’, ‘moody’, ‘anxious’, ‘tense’ and even ‘psychotic’, although a number of 
women were clearly attuned to what their husbands were going through: ‘poor him, he has to 
work from morning till night’; ‘poor him, he lost his job’. 
 
However, it was clear from their narratives that a number of women also saw many aspects 
of their husbands’ behaviour as manifestations of a more generalised pattern of injustice, 
legitimated by their culture and religion, which allowed men to abuse their power over 
women. Pareesha explained that the reason why so many of the women who came to her 
shop had problems to discuss was that: ‘Afghan men are cruel’. She contrasted the 
treatment of women in Afghanistan to what she had seen in Iran: ‘Iran is really good from this 
point of view. You can’t put pressure on women. Here they look on women as a slave’. 
 
Parwana also spoke of both individual injustices and their structural underpinnings. She was 
bitter about her daily burden of work – at home, in the office and looking after the flock of 
sheep her husband had invested in – and of his failure to acknowledge or help her out in any 
way: ‘I wake at 4 o’clock in the morning and I work till ten-thirty in the evening. It should not 
be like this in the family… No one helps out at home but one son’. She did not hold Afghan 
values in high regard:  
 
In an Islamic society, women are like slaves… regardless of whatever progress 
Afghanistan makes, its people will still be backward. They have traditional ideas, like 
women are the slaves of the house. Regardless of the changes in the environment, 
men’s way of thinking doesn’t change. 
 
Naz believed while women’s roles as mothers placed them on a higher plane than men, the 
reality they faced was one of oppression. Others appealed to notions of justice based on 
their humanity: ‘we are not animals’. 
 
The critical stance taken by some of the women in our sample with regard to their own 
society clearly cannot be dismissed as the influence of ‘Western feminist views’. These 
women simply did not subscribe to some monolithic notion of Afghan values: they distanced 
themselves from the values of the Taliban, for instance, resenting the imposition of the all-
encompassing burqa on a community whose women had customarily worn the more 
practical chadar or simply a headscarf. They saw little wrong in women’s presence in the 
public domain, whether it was to go to work, to school, to the market or to the shrine, if they 
had received permission from their husbands. Some preferred to be accompanied, if only by 
a child, but in one case, the possession of a mobile phone allowed the family to always know 
where the woman in question went.  
 
However, their expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction did not only relate to life under the 
Taliban and their version of Pashtun culture but also to the unfairness of the norms and 
values that governed their own lives and the lives of other women in their community. They 
did not reject religious or cultural codes about rights and responsibilities but they felt a keen 
sense of injustice that violations of these codes went unnoticed, unpunished and even 
condoned.  
 
This ability to take a critical stance towards their own society, to ask whether it could be 
organised differently, is at least in part a product of some of the changes that they have lived 
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through in recent years. For some, time spent as refugees in Iran had provided them an 
alternative vantage point from which to compare their own society. The fact that it was also 
an Islamic state made the comparison carry greater weight. Women felt that the very fact of 
having travelled, of having seen how others lived, had a profound impact not only on the 
women themselves but also on many of the men.  
 
For others, the experience of life, first under the mujahidin and then the Taliban, had helped 
to crystallise the importance of some of the freedoms that they had previously enjoyed and 
which had been taken away. This might simply involve the freedom to choose how they 
would cover themselves or the ability to move around in the public domain with their family’s 
consent without necessarily having also to answer to strange men. For others it was the 
freedom to go to work, to school, to the shrines, to have some earning power of their own 
rather than ‘to only eat’. 
 
The fall of the Taliban had not only restored some of these earlier freedoms but had been 
accompanied by other changes as well. Key among these was the emergence of a new 
legalistic discourse around gender equality and women’s rights, actively promoted by the 
international community, by donor agencies and NGOs within the country and by their own 
aid-dependent government. Both women and men learnt about the evolving culture of 
women’s rights from their televisions, from their forays into the public domain and from their 
interactions with each other. TV, in particular, has become an important vehicle for conveying 
competing discourses about women’s place in Afghan society, both the discourses of 
religious leaders as well as educational programmes about women’s rights and soap operas 
that opened the window on how women lived in other societies. Not surprisingly, TV had 
become a source of contention in some households. Nadia’s father would not allow a TV in 
the house: ‘there are things on TV we don’t want our daughters to watch. There are bad 
films. Children become disrespectful’.  
 
Some women regarded the idea of equality with men as a direct contravention of their basic 
beliefs: how was it possible for women to go out of the house without their husband’s 
permission? Others appeared to welcome the emergence of the new rights discourse as a 
force for restraining male power and making men more accountable for their actions. They 
questioned the apparent monopoly that men appeared to enjoy in terms of rights and the 
absence of any mechanism within the traditional moral economy to restrain the misuse of 
their privileges. An evolving alternative jurisdiction, exemplified by the constitutional and legal 
recognition of gender equality, by the new national machinery for women’s advancement and 
human rights and by the growing number of women’s organisations, appeared to offer some 
redress to the stark inequalities of the classical patriarchal contract. It was not necessarily 
the case that any of the women we spoke to would actually have taken their husbands to the 
AIHRC but they felt that its very presence acted as a countervailing force to the power of 
religion and the moral community.  
 
It is in the context of these larger changes that we need to locate women’s experiences of 
microfinance. In an economy where large numbers of men were finding it hard to live up to 
their socially sanctioned roles as primary breadwinners, it is not surprising that men were 
often more eager than women to take advantage of loan facilities for women in order to set 
up various enterprises of their own. Given the resilience of patriarchal constraints on 
women’s lives, it is not surprising that microfinance does not appear to have had any 
dramatic impacts on women’s lives but it is important not to miss out some of the subtle shifts 
in agency, the almost imperceptible widening of women’s sphere of social interactions, that 
their experience of microfinance brought about.  
 
Extremely important for women’s experience with microfinance was how productively the 
loans were used. For some households, it marked a slide into increasingly greater debt and 
heightened levels of stress for women and for their families. Others used the loans more 
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profitably. While only a few women set up their own enterprises, most expanded their 
economic contributions to their households. Along with a marked improvement in household 
livelihood security and standard of living, we were able to discern a number of other tangible 
and less tangible gains which meshed with some of the ideas about empowerment that we 
outlined at the start of this paper. One set of gains related to women’s position within the 
household. The fact that women were the conduit through which the loans entered the 
household appeared to have increased their voice and influence in a number of households. 
For some women, being singled out for loans had given them a sense of efficacy: ‘I am like a 
man’. A number spoke of the lessening of domestic violence and tensions as a result of the 
easing of economic pressures on men as primary breadwinners. Many believed that they 
were viewed with greater respect, not only by their husbands and immediate family 
members, but also within their local community. They were often approached for advice by 
other women within the community who wanted to access loans for their own families.  
 
This relates to a second important change associated with access to microfinance which was 
the widening of women’s sphere of interactions. In some cases, this was the result of regular 
meetings with women from their loan group, women who they might have known previously, 
but who they had no reason to interact with on a regular basis. In some cases, it was their 
visits to the NGO office where they met with other women like themselves with whom they 
shared their problems and stories. And in a few cases, these interactions occurred as a 
result of the expansion of their economic activity. These interactions were important because 
it brought home to women the fact that some of the injustices they suffered were not unique 
to them but common to many women and sanctioned by their culture. Through their 
interactions in the market place, in the public bathers, at the hairdressers and the office of 
their microfinance organisation, they learnt about other Muslim societies, such as Iran, in 
which women enjoyed greater rights and they found out that there were new laws and 
organisations in Afghanistan that might help to curb the excesses of male power within their 
own families.  
  
For most of the women in our sample, targeting microfinance to women, with all the 
qualifications that organisations in Afghanistan have introduced to make it more acceptable, 
is a positive aspect of these programmes. Whether women handed the loans directly to their 
husbands or used it in some ways themselves, it gave them a degree of authority in the 
household that they had not had before and expanded their horizons through work 
opportunities and social interactions. Loans directed to men would not have had this effect.  
 
Where we do not see much evidence of change in this group of women is in their capacity to 
exercise collective voice in the wider community and to act collectively to bring about 
change. Certainly, all of them voted and were eager to discuss the reasons for their vote. As 
Naghma put it, they saw their right to vote as an important recognition of their status as 
citizens. But none of the women spoke of coming together with others to bring about a more 
just society.  
 
This may have to wait for the next generation. Certainly, they have done what they could with 
the meagre resources at their disposal to invest in a better future for their daughters, carving 
out what we might call an ‘inter-generational pathway of empowerment’. As we saw, Naghma 
used her earnings to pay for her daughter’s education so that she would be ‘somebody’. 
Safa, whose own education was interrupted by the coming to power of the Mujahidin, said 
that all her efforts at home and work were to make sure her daughters went to school so that 
they could get decent jobs: ‘There is an old saying: ‘The destiny of the daughter will be the 
same as the destiny of the mother’. But I don’t think like this. I think everyone decides their 
own destiny’. 
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Parwana said:  
 
I want my daughter to be educated, to go to university, to get engaged and marry so 
that she can know the story of life. A girl should finish her education in her father’s 
home because once she goes to her husband’s home, she will not be able to study. I 
would like her to work. If someone is bad, they will be just as bad if they stayed at 
home. If someone is good, they will be good everywhere. 
 
The accounts given by women like Jamila suggest that younger women are indeed becoming 
more assertive than their mothers about what they want from their lives: ‘This daughter of 
mine is a little disobedient. She says I won’t marry him if I see him and don’t like him. But 
only to me. If she said it to her father there would be trouble’. But, as the quote below 
illustrates, she also see positive changes in her sons who now admonish their father to be 
less authoritarian and gentler with his children.  
 
As we noted, the survey by WfW found surprisingly high levels of optimism about the future 
among the women interviewed, with those who belonged to the organisation expressing 
greater optimism than non-members. Our research helps to explain this result, at least in 
relation to the Hazara women in our study. It expresses their belief that, despite the 
upheavals they had undergone and were still undergoing, despite the state of political 
instability in the country and the continued threat of the Taliban, their society was changing 
for the better. The greater freedom of movement, increased opportunities for work and 
education, the ability to vote, the setting up of a new constitution and strengthening of a legal 
system that promised greater equality, exposure to alternative realities through migration, TV 
and contacts with women’s organisations, all of these gave them a greater sense of 
optimism, if not for themselves, then for their daughters. We hear this optimism coming 
through in some of their narratives:  
 
Of course there have been changes. Now women have control over themselves. 
Women couldn’t work, now they work in an office. Women have advanced, now 
they are lawyers, they are bosses... some of my uncle’s daughters are doctors… 
they studied, they took exams. Working is not bad at all. Both men and women 
have to work. Women can contribute to the home… (but that is good only when 
women actually work and do not do anything immoral). (Saeeda) 
 
It has got better here – men cannot assert as much pressure as before. They too 
have seen the world. Women have more freedom, they work in offices. It is good 
for a woman to go out. For Afghan women, education is best. Men should give 
freedom of education to women. Women should not only knit and do embroidery. 
Of course this is an art but the most important thing is education. Domestic 
violence has reduced. Men have been around and their eyes have been opened. 
Before boys and girls were forced to marry each other... Now they have become 
friends with each other and then they marry so love and kindness is built between 
them – that reduces violence. My son is now married. They love each other so 
much because they married with love… They both work so they leave home with 
each other and they come back in the evening. There has not been too much 
change in my house, my husband’s way of thinking is traditional but I have to 
tolerate it. I have patience. God willing, if the country continues like this, the future 
will be better. The more people study, the better it gets. They – my daughters – are 
the builders of the future. Where there is education, there is progress. (Pareesha)  
 
I think my daughter will have a better future because people are modern now. 
When I was young my work was very difficult… I used to graze cows and pay all 
the money to my father. Now my daughters have their own money. They are 
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literate and don’t misuse their money. Before they would bribe the teacher and go 
and do farming. Now they are at school. (Nadia’s mother) 
 
My daughters will have a better future than me, they will have good husbands. 
They will have a good life. I think girls have become more aware. They have been 
educated. They have understood things. There have been changes. My daughters 
watch whatever they want to on TV. Their father’s time has passed. My sons know 
better. My eldest son is educated. It is obvious he knows more than his father. 
They know the difference between right and wrong. If they continue in this way, it 
will be better. Sons advise their fathers, don’t do this or don’t do that. My eldest 
son tells his father, ‘Don’t shout, don’t blame the youngest son, encourage him. 
Tell him if you study well, I will buy you this’. Since the fall of the Taliban, there has 
been a reduction in domestic violence. Men have understood that beating is bad. 
People have realised it is better to have good behaviour. They have learnt through 
TV programmes and from other people. (Jamila) 
 
 
8  Conclusion  
 
Returning to the debates that provide a framework for our analysis, how do these narratives 
speak to the different positions outlined in them? We clearly cannot attempt to claim that the 
views of the 12 women in our sample represent the views of Afghan women in general but 
we can claim that these views are unlikely to be unique or idiosyncratic in Afghan society, but 
one strand of thinking. In this concluding section, we want to draw out some key elements in 
their narrative that tell us about how they experience their lives as women, what aspects of 
the current social arrangements they would like to hold on to and what they would like to see 
changed. These elements help to position the women in our sample in relation to the larger 
debates. 
 
First of all, we would argue that the idea of a patriarchal contract which is woven into much of 
their narratives about gender relations in the family represents in microcosm a notion of 
society and citizenship that is closer to the communitarian vision of mutual responsibility than 
the liberal one of equal rights. The women in our study see themselves as located within 
social networks of obligations and responsibilities, with family and kinship constituting their 
central core. Since these claims and obligations are themselves embedded within Afghan 
patriarchal kinship structures, Afghan norms and values clearly play a significant role in 
giving substance to these claims and obligations and providing the discourses in which they 
are expressed.  
 
But we would also argue that lived realities of the men and women in our sample depart, 
often dramatically, from the normative prescriptions of the patriarchal contract, a departure 
that is almost inevitable, given the inherent gender asymmetries of family life. Women’s 
responsibilities within the family are not only normatively enforced but also bolstered by their 
material dependence on male family members and the absence of any place for them in 
society outside the family circle6 (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2006). Men’s responsibilities, on 
the other hand, are not based on equivalent dependence on women. While men may depend 
on women to bear their children and carry out unpaid domestic and care work within the 
family, their position within the family and the wider society allows them far greater power, 
authority and resources than women to interpret familial claims and obligations on their own 
terms. Family life is thus characterised by relationships of highly unequal interdependence.  
                                                 
6  As Azarbaijani-Moghaddam points out, in a society where all accountability is upwards to more powerful males, and 
sometimes females, women’s biggest concern is to avoid exclusion or expulsion from the family and society and the 
loss of protected status that this would entail.  
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to expand on how women have fared in these 
relationships in the past, but those in our present sample did not appear to receive the 
reverence and respect within the domestic sphere or exercise the authority that some 
observers have claimed. Their contributions to the household economy went largely 
unrecognised until they became monetised. Male privilege remained largely intact even when 
men themselves were struggling to discharge their responsibilities. We noted the widespread 
use of violence within the family. Violence is used on a routine basis, most often by 
husbands against wives, but also by other dominant members over those subordinate to 
them. It is used to enforce obedience and punish transgressions but it also appears to be 
used to express the frustrations and disappointments that men in the family face in trying to 
live up to their expected role as family providers. The routine use of violence explains why 
expressions of fear appeared with regular frequency in women’s narratives, fear reflecting 
the arbitrary use power and authority within the households and internalised by at least one 
of the women in our sample as an appropriate way for wives to regard their husbands. 
 
Women’s responses to this exercise of power without any apparent accountability within the 
family appear to mirror some of the differing positions in larger debates about these issues. 
First of all, there were those women – however they appeared to be a minority in our small 
sample – who placed their hope in the introduction of measures within the customary 
structures of authority that would enforce male responsibility and hold men accountable. This 
was most evident in their support for Mohsini’s proposal for Shia’a personal law reform. They 
did not question their subordinate status within the family, but they sought firmer assurance 
that men would honour their obligations and hence provide the protections that went with 
women’s dependent status.   
 
A second group of women welcomed the evolving legal apparatus as a complement to the 
traditional structures of authority within the community in holding men to account. It appeared 
to them that religion had given men monopoly over rights, making women’s rights conditional 
on the consent of their husbands, but had done little to enforce the responsibilities on which 
male rights rested. The greater attention to women’s rights within the constitution, the legal 
system and the newly established commission for human rights thus appeared to address a 
major lacuna within the customary framework of rights and responsibilities.  
 
The third group also welcomed the emerging structure of rights and responsibilities but 
stressed the importance of women’s rights (to balance the customary stress on women’s 
responsibilities) along with men’s responsibilities (to balance the customary stress on men’s 
rights). While they too valued the interdependencies of family life, they spoke out forcefully 
against the injustices that men as individuals could perpetrate on the basis of the privileges 
associated with men as a group. They spoke of the need for greater equality of rights 
between men and women and pointed to some of the ways in which Afghan society was 
changing to allow for relationships that were based on mutual love and respect rather than 
fear and violence. Their narratives allowed the greatest scope for a more egalitarian model of 
gender relations in which the idea that women might have freedom to move around in the 
public domain, to get a job, to educate themselves and their daughters, to have a say in who 
they married, to visit their parents after marriage, as well as freedom from violence and the 
arbitrary use of power, did not appear to constitute an unacceptable violation of Afghan 
culture or religious piety.  
 
To sum up therefore, the women in our sample did not experience ‘Afghan culture’ as a 
monolithic and internally coherent system that lay outside the realm of contestation but as 
the lived relationships of everyday life which had to be negotiated on a daily basis from highly 
unequal positions. There was no reason for these women to regard culture as this monolithic 
presence since culture has certainly not been static in Afghanistan. Successive efforts to 
modify and reinforce gender inequalities in the country – most recently, the manufacture of 
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the culture of jihad during the resistance to the Soviet invasion to galvanise fighters and win 
the support of Afghan society and the counter-efforts of the international community to 
promote universalist ideas about gender equality – provide the backdrop against ordinary 
men and women’s continued struggle to earn a living and bring up their children. The 
narratives that inform our analysis can therefore be read as the views of women participating 
in a larger societal transition from ‘doxa’, where only one interpretation of culture was 
possible, to ‘discourse’, where competing interpretations have come into view (Bourdieu 
1977). It is not surprising that even within our small sample of 12 women, we find dissenting 
views about hegemonic interpretations of their culture, about what they value and what they 
would like to change.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Summary of livelihood activities 
 
 
 Background Livelihood activities 
BRAC: SAFA Age 27, illiterate, mother of 
two boys and three girls. Two 
children are blind and study 
at home with tutors, others 
are in school. She was 
widowed once and remarried 
while in Iran. 
When she was married to her first husband she would sew shawls and ‘break 
almonds’ for fuel. Before leaving for Iran, her mother-in-law used to ‘work for 
a Panjshiri family’ earning a small wage and collecting leftover food for the 
family to eat. Her father-in-law used to repair shoes and made a small profit. 
Her brother-in-law (who is now in Iran) is a drug addict and used to forcibly 
take money to pay for his addiction. After her return to Kabul, she sold 
jewellery (which she brought from Iran) to help build their house. She and her 
father-in-law presently run a small shop (selling household goods, foods, 
sweets and soft drinks). In addition to loans they invested their savings (from 
Iran) into the business. Her present (disabled) husband is an occasional day 
labourer. They receive $60 a year from wheat cultivated by others on lands 
they own. They own their house and pay no rent. 
BRAC: 
PARWANA  
Age 37, secondary school 
graduate, seven children who 
are being educated at various 
levels. 
Her husband was in the military at first. Then he acquired a contract with the 
Rabbani Government and the Taliban, to provide them with stationery and 
mobiles. The government didn’t pay what they owed, so they used loans to 
buy chickens and sheep and sell eggs. They changed to animal husbandry 
and now they have more than 30 sheep and goats. She also used to work at 
a Finance Department for eight years. Now, her husband works for GTZ 
[German Cooperation] as a mechanic and she works for NDI (National 
Democratic Institute) as a guard.  
BRAC: 
LAYLA 
Age 35, illiterate, seven 
children, out of whom three 
daughters are tutored at 
home and two had to leave 
school due to poverty and 
dislocation. Three sons gave 
up school to work and one is 
a baby.  
Her husband was a farmer in Ghazni. In Kabul, he worked cleaning the storm 
drains in the street. Then he got a job at the Ministry of Trade where he was 
a messenger. He bought a car from the money he saved to run a taxi. Then 
he became crippled so he sold the car and they rented a shop. Now he has 
gone to Ghazni for one month to be a daily labourer. Son works in the shop. 
Her husband sometimes sends money. When she came to her husband’s 
house after marriage, she made bread, milk, and yoghurt and sometimes 
they sold it. She made some quilts; this work was provided by the district 
councillor ‘wakil’. She went to an office and would take the quilts to make and 
they would pay her 50 AFA [$1], or sometimes 100 AFA [$2]. Her daughter 
would make carpets in Ghazni but they don’t in Kabul as they are scared 
they will ruin them and will not be able to pay for the damage. 
BRAC: 
JAMILA 
Age 45, illiterate, four sons 
and four daughters all of 
whom have been educated 
up to at least secondary 
school, with the exception of 
one daughter who remains 
illiterate due to the Taliban’s 
ban on girls’ schooling. 
Currently her eldest son is a guard in an office; second son is a mechanic in 
a workshop and her husband rents electric generators to people. Her sons 
and husband bring her almonds which they break all day long and keep the 
skin as ‘wood’ fuel for the winter. Before the loan they had a rented house, 
now they have two houses. Her husband used to work as a porter. They 
moved to Ghazni for one year then came back to Kabul. Her husband was a 
taxi driver and the only bread-winner for the family, six years ago. Then they 
started carpet weaving and bought a loom to weave carpets on and then her 
sons went to Pakistan and sent money from there. 
BRAC: 
PAREESA 
Age 38, educated up to sixth 
grade, had three sons from 
first marriage who are in Iran. 
From second marriage has 
one baby boy and two young 
sons in primary school, and 
two step-daughters who earn 
and have been educated, 
through secondary school. 
She worked in Iran as a hairdresser and her husband made wardrobes. 
When she came back to Afghanistan, she went to a hairdresser’s to work, 
but was not paid well and was cheated. Now, her husband is a taxi driver. 
Her step-daughter works at BRAC as a Credit Officer. She took a loan to 
open a hairdressing salon with her business partner, which she currently 
runs. 
BRAC: 
SAEEDA 
Age 50, studied to sixth 
grade, has two sons 
educated, one daughter 
married, three daughters in 
school. 
Husband was truck driver, would drive goods from Mazar to Ghazni. He fell ill 
and daughter started weaving carpets. She shelled almonds to use the skin 
for fuel. Second son became a tailor and she would assist him in making 
trousers. Now her son works in the BRAC office. Currently, she makes quilts, 
with the money she earns she buys paper, pencils and socks for her 
daughters. People give her orders and materials and she asks around to find 
reasonable prices for quilts, she makes 2–4 quilts a month. Husband is now 
a taxi driver.  
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WFW: NAZ Age 45, illiterate, oldest 
daughter weaves carpets, 
one son and one daughter in 
school.  
Husband worked as a driver (rented vehicle), but then had an accident so he 
left that job. Then he became a money changer, but his money was stolen. 
Now he is looking to work as a driver again – meanwhile is a porter. He has 
health issues and is deaf. Husband’s father had property which was passed 
on to them. She does home-based embroidery, and takes it to the shop 
herself. She is paid for each one she sells. Prior to doing embroidery, along 
with the family, she had started carpet weaving but stopped because she 
learnt on TV that it would damage her children’s health.  
WFW: 
FARAH 
Age 24, studied up to fourth 
grade, two young daughters 
in primary school and one 
baby son. 
Husband has a carpet shop in Kabul. She does embroidery which she takes 
to international organisations to sell. Father-in-law has a shop selling fruit 
and vegetables. Sister-in-law does tailoring. Mother cleans homes in 
expatriate community. Mother-in-law works in a day care centre for children 
of expatriate community. She did carpet weaving for seven years when she 
came back to Kabul.  
WFW: NADIA Age 18, unmarried, illiterate, 
carpet-worker. 
Her family was carpet weaving in Pakistan. Now her father has a hand cart 
and sells vegetables. One brother sells salt and the other brother sells 
potatoes. Mother, sisters and one brother have a carpet business: weave 
carpets and make tassels for scarves.  
WFW: 
HAFIZA 
Age 35, studied three years, 
five daughters, two are in 
school. 
When she came to Kabul during Taliban rule, she twisted wool for carpets. 
When the Taliban left she started baking. She baked for two years and then 
they bought their current house. She started her own bakery by taking loans. 
She is working as a baker, as there was no women’s bakery in their 
neighbourhood. They have a small bakery where her husband and one of her 
daughters work. They have three other shops, which they rent. Previously 
her husband had a cart and she worked in a bakery. Recently, he started 
working as a daily labourer doing construction as well. Daughters come 
home from school and weave carpets.  
WFW: 
NAGHMA 
Age 29, somewhat literate, 
five children, one daughter 
and two sons in primary 
school, one daughter not 
studying and one baby. 
Husband is a tailor (who works from home). She makes vests for her 
husband. Husband’s income supports them and his parents who live outside 
of Kabul. He has a contract with large shops and produces high quality 
clothing. He has three female ‘assistants’ who work as labourers from their 
homes. She recently learnt how to make waistcoats so she could make more 
money. Previously, during the day she would go with her husband to soak 
the soil and in the evenings they would weave carpets. 
 
WFW: WAFA Age 45, widow, taking adult 
literacy course, three 
daughters and two sons, all 
educated up to secondary 
level. 
Husband was a police officer, was lost during the war – she is now a widow. 
She used to make soup 1–2 times a week and would take it to the shops to 
sell it. She has also woven carpets and shelled almonds for money. More 
than four years ago, she knitted body cloths (to shower with) and cardigans 
and sold them to people and she and her daughters would also weave 
carpets. One son has a shoemakers shop. Another son is working as an 
interpreter with an international organisation.  
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